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Where a testator in unambiguous language devised a lot in section 32 of the
town of Joliet, parol evidence is not admissible to show that he meant a lot in
section 31.

For the purpose of determining the object of testator's bounty or the subject
of disposition, parol evidence may be received; but in this case the devise was
certain both as to object and subject, and the court could not look beyond the.
instrument itself.
In a bill for a partition of land devised by a father, parol testimony is admissible
to show that one of the parties (a daughter) has been in possession of part of the
land, and has made valuable improvements under a promise by testator to convey.
Such evidence is not to affect the will, but the rights of parties under it, and the
daughter is entitled to have the part improved by her set out in her purpart, or to
be allowed for her improvements if partition cannot be thus made.

Tuis was a bill for partition filed by John Hibner and others,

children and heirs at law of John Hibner, deceased, against
Charles, Elizabeth, and James Kurtz.
The bill alleged, that by the death of the deceased, complainants and defendants, except James, became seised in fee as tenants
S. W. sec. 33, T. 35, R. 10, E. 80
in common of the W.
acres, and the S. j E. S. E. 82, T. 35, R. 10, E. 40 acres :
that Elizabeth was entitled to the undivided one-sixth part-of the
lands; that James claimed title to the forty-acre tract, and that
Elizabeth is a daughter of the deceased, and the wife of Charles,
The appellants answered, admitting the allegations of the bill,
except as to the intestacy of Hibner; and averred that he d-vised
the eighty acre tract to Elizabeth, and the forty acres to James;
that there was a misdescription of the lands in the will, and that
Charles and Elizabeth had been in possession of, and made valuable improvements upon, the eighty-acre tract, upon the promise
of the deceased that he would give the same to Elizabeth.
The usual replication was filed, cause heard, and decree rendered for partition.
To reverse this decree, appellants brought the case to this court.
The Circuit Court refused to hear parol evidence to explain the
language of the will. The only provisions of the will to be considered are the following:-
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3d. I give and bequeath to my daughter, llizabeth Kurtz, all
that tract or parcel of land situate in the town of Joliet, Will
county, Illinois, and described as follows: The west half of the
south-west quarter, section thirty-two, township thirty-five, range
ten, containing eighty acres, more or less, together with all the
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.
" 7th. I give and bequeath to my grandson, James Kurtz, all
that part or parcel of land described as the south half of the
east half of the south quarter, section thirty-one, in township
thirty-five, range ten, containing forty acres, more or less."
Appellants offered to prove that testator, at the time of his
death, owned only one eighty-acre tract in township thirty-five,
which was the one described in the bill; that a mistake was made
in drafting the will, by the insertion of the words, " section thirtytwo," instead of section " thirty-three ;" that Charles and Elizabeth Kurtz had been in the actual possession of the tract for a
number of years; and' upon the repeated promise of the testator
in his lifetime that he would give the same to Elizabeth, had
made lasting and valuable improvements at their own expense on
the land; had fenced it, and erected thereon a dwelling-house,
barn, and coin-cribs, dug wells, and set out fruit-trees.
Appellants also offered to prove that James Kurtz, at the time
of the death of the testator, was in the actual possession of the
forty-acre tract as the tenant of the deceased, and that the draftsman of the will, by mistake, inserted the word "1one" after the
words "1section thirty," instead of "1two," so as to bequeath to
James land in section thirty-one, instead of section thirty-two.
This evidence was rejected by the court on the hearing.
1). H. Pinney, for appellants.
W.

. Goodhue, for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
THORNTON, J.-It has been strongly urged by counsel that
the evidence offered by appellants should have been received for
the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the testator.
The will devises land to Elizabeth in section thirty-two; the
parol evidence offered was for the purpose of locating the land
in section thirty-three.
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The will devised to James the south half of the east half of the
south quarter of section thirty-one.
It was proposed to show by parol evidence that the testator
intended to devise to James the south half of the east half of the
south-east quarter of section thirty-two.
The law requires that all wills of land shall be in writing; and
extrinsic evidence is never admissible to alter, detract from, or
add to the terms of a will. To permit evidence, the effect of
which would be to take from a will plain and unambiguous language and insert other language in lieu thereof, would violate the
foregoing well-established rule. For the purpose of determining
the object of the testator's bounty or the subject of disposition,
parol evidence may be received to enable the court to identify the
person or thing intended.
In this regard the evidence offered afforded no aid to the court.
The devise is certain, both as to the object and subject. There
are no two objects-no two subjects.
The intention of the testator must prevail. How shall this be
ascertained? In the case of Smith v. Bell, 6 Peters 74, Chief
Justice MARSHALL says: "1The first and great rule in the exposition of wills, to which all rules must bend, is that the intention
of the testator, expressed in his will, shall prevail, provided it be
consistent with the rules of law. This principle is asserted in the
construction of every testamentary disposition. It is.
emphatically the will of the person who makes it, and is defined to be the
legal declaration of a man's intentions, which he wills to be performed after his death. These intentions are to be collected from
his words, and ought to be carried into effect, if they be consistent
with law."
The thing devised is certain and specific; section, township, and
range are given. The evidence offered as to the mistake in the
section would have made a new and different will. The testator
devised lands in certain sections. The description is full, certain,
and explicit. No doubt arises upon the reading of the will.
Every mind is forced to the same conclusion, that the 'land devised,
the subject of disposition, is clearly and without the slighest ambiguity described.
The language is not applicable to any other land. No extrinsic
evidence, then, is needed to identify the thing intended. The
intention is manifest from the word8 of the will.
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The case of Tucker et al. v. Seamans' Aid Society, 7 Met. 188,
is cited by appellants' counsel. It appeared in that case that in
consequence of incorrect information the legatee was not probably
the object of the testator's bounty. Other societies claimed the
legacy. The court, however, decided that the legacy should be
paid to the "society" designated in the will, not upon extrinsic
proof, but upon the words of the will.
The case of Biggs v. Myers, 20 Mo. 239, is also cited by counsel for appellants. That case is very different from the one under
consideration. The testator in that case made a full disposition
of all his estate, and there described certain lands, locating them
in a township in Which he owned no lands. The land intended
to be devised was, however, identified by reference to the "big
spring" upon it.
In the case before the court there is no disposition, either
specifically or generally, of the lands in bill mentioned.
We think, therefore, there was no error in refusing the admission of extrinsic evidence to detract from or add to the terms of
the will. The law requires the will to be in writing, to be executed
in the presence of two witnesses and with certain solemnities, to
insur6 its correctness and protect the testator from mistake and
imposition.
There is no ambiguity in this case, as is urged. When we look
at the will it is all plain and clear. It is only the proof aliunde
which creates any doubt; and such proof we hold to be inadmissible: Doe v. Hiscocks, 5 Mees. & Welsby 363; Miller v. Traverce,
8 Bing. 244; Jacksonv. Sill, 11 Johns. 212; Jackson v. Wilkinson, 17 Id. 146; Mann v. Mann, 1 Johns. Oh. 231.
The decree in this case must, however, be reversed for the
refusal of the court to admit the evidence offered, as affecting the
rights and interests of the parties in making the partition. By
the decree, the court found that Elizabeth Kurtz was entitled to
the undivided one-sixth part of the lands, without any direction
to the commissioners to assign to her the portion improved, and
in case partition could not be made to allow her a reasonable
remuneration from her co-tenants who received the benefit of the
improvements. This was error: Louvalle et al. v. Menard et al.,
1 Gilman 39; Dean et al. v. O'Meara et al. 47 Ill. 121; Borah
v. Archer, 7 Dana 176.
It would be inequitable to jermit the complainants to share in
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the benefits of the improvements without making some compensation to the defendants for the necessary increased value to the
land occasioned by the improvements.
As to the eighty-acre tract, we think from the evidence offered
that Elizabeth Kurtz is entitled to specific performance of the
parol promise repeatedly made by her father. Appellants offered
to prove such parol promise by the testator in his lifetime to
Elizabeth, and that in consequence of such promise possession
was taken and extensive and valuable improvements made by
them. A court of equity will always enforce a promise upon
which reliance is placed, and which induces the expenditure of
labor and money in the improvement of land. Such a promise
rests upon a valuable consideration. The promissee acts upon the
faith of the promise.
We can perceive no important distinction between such a
promise and a sale. Courts would sanction wrong and fraud not
to sustain such a promise. If the proof offered can be made, then
Elizabeth is entitled to specific performance, and a decree for the
conveyance of the eighty acres to her upon the filing the proper
bill: Bright et al. v. Bright, 41 Ill. 97; Sheppard v. Bevin, 9
Gill 32; King'8 H7eirs v. Thompson, 9 Peters 204.
We do not think that James Kurtz has any title to the forty
acres by virtue of the will or otherwise, and partition should be
made of it.
Decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause
remanded with instruction to that court to proceed in
accordance with this opinion, and with leave to Elizabeth to file her cross-bill.
We regret the necessity of dissenting,
so entirely as we must, from the argument and conclusions of the learned
judge in the foregoing opinion. But
if we say anything, we must, of course,
say what we think; and even silence is
From the
liable to misconstruction.
general doctrine of the case, that oral
proof is not admissible to explain or
vary the words of a written instrument,
there could be no dissent. But there
are so many exceptions and qualifications of the rule, that no case is ever
tried, where the force, operation and conVOL.XIX.-7

struction of a written intrument are
concerned, that oral evidence is not
received in aid of its construction. To
such an extent is this true, that it would
be impossible for any court tot fix the
construction of a will in such a manner as to make any reasonable approximation to the truth of the instrument,
without the admission of such evidence.
For the court, then, to throw themselves back upon the general rule,
and reject all oral proof, upon the
broad ground that the will must speak
by its words, is much the same as
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refusing to receive oral proof in any
other case where the matter rests wholly
in parol, and practically amounts to a
denial of justice. We understand well
enough, of course, in the present case,
that the court felt compelled to reject
the evidence offered, and that if there
had been, in their apprehension, any
clear way to admit it they would gladly
have so done.
If the ground upon which the evidence was offered, is fully stated by
the judge iu giving the opinion, it is
not improbable the court may have
fallen into the misapprehension, partly
on account of the true ground of the
admissibility of the evidence not being
fully or understandingly stated at the
time the ei idence was offered. Commonly, where evidence is offered, upon
a ground and for a purpose for which it
is not admissible, it is not error in the
court to reject it, although upon other
grounds, and for other purposes, it
might have been admissible. But the
rejection of the evidence here is not
placed upon any such narrow ground.
The court seemed to suppose the evidence not admissible for any purpose, or
upon any ground.
The court say, indeed, that the evidence was offered by the appellants for
the purpose of showing that the will
was by mistake drawn differently from
what the testator intended. That precise point was immaterial, and the evidence was not, strictly speaking, admissible for that purpose. That would be
to add a new term to the will by making it read, in terms, as the testator
would have had it made, if he had
recollected the number of the sections in
which his lands lay, which can never
be done. And the rule, excluding oral
proof in explanation of written instruments, applies to the language of the
instrument, and not to its import or
construction : 1 Greenl. Ev. § 277.
But nothing is more common, or we
might say universal, than to receive

oral proof to show, that language was
used in a peculiar sense, or that one
term was used for another, or that an
essential term, to make the definition
perfect, was wholly omitted or erroneously stated. These corrections, so
to speak, are every day made by courts,
in fixing the construction of wills and
other written instruments, by the aid
of extraneous evidence in regard to
the state and condition of the subjectmatter of the devise, or of the devisee, or of the testator in regard to
the one or the other. But for this latitude of construction, and the aid thus
derived from oral proof, the administration of the law would become but
a succession of blunders in the dark.
The familiar illustration of a promissory note expressed, "I promise not
to pay," &c., will occur to all. The
court found no difficulty in holding it a
valid note, and a promise to pay. The
case of Wilbar v. Snith, 5 Allen 194, well
illustrates the practice of the courts in
supplying a word omitted. The word
"4residue" was there wholly omitted in
the residuary clause, which was perfect
in all other respects, providing that the
legatees, who had received particular
legacies, should receive in proportion to
their former legacies, but did not say
what they should receive. There could
be but one answer to this question, and
that was, the residue of the estate, and
the court so held. And one would
blush for the lameness of the law, and
of its administration, if the court had
done otherwise. The books are filled
with similar cases. And the present
case, when properly considered, and
fully comprehended, is one of precisely
the same character, except that it is
attended with far less difficulty than the
one last cited. Here the description is
entirely sufficient, and more than sufficient, if we confine ourselves to the
particulars, which are truly stated. The
description would have been sufficient
by merely naming the township in
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which the land lay; and in many cases
a devise of a right of land is held valid,
without fixing the location withjn any
particular township even ; as in Townsend v. Downer, 23 Vt. 225, where the
description was, If a certain right of
land I purchased, lying on the main,
supposed to be in Vermont ;" and the
registry of titles in the town of Burlington, Vermont, showing a right of
land standing in the name of the testator, the court held the devise applied
to that until it appeared the testator
held some other right in the state to
which the words would apply. Testators too often depend upon memory, in
describing lands in their wills, and are
by consequence liable to great indefiniteness, and occasional error. And the
courts have, for a long period of years,
felt compelled to deal with these descriptions in a very lenient manner, and
to reach the intent of the testator, where
that seemed practicable, by the act of
construction and by the admission of
oral evidence to remove latent ambiguities.
One rule upon the subject is so
thoroughly established as to have become
a maxim in the law, falsa demonstratio
non nocet. The practical meaning of this
maxim is, that however many errors
there may be in the description, either
of the legatee or of the subject-matter
of the devise, it will not avoid the
bequest, provided enough remains to
show, with reasonable certainty, what
was intended: Boman Catholic Orphan
Asylum v. Emmons, 3 Bradf. Sur. Rep.
144; Jackson v. Sill, 11 Johns. 201,
218, at which latter page Mr. Justice
THomPsoN, a very high authority, describes the force and extent of the
maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet, and
shows very clearly, that in a state of
facts like those in the principal case
there is not the slightest difficulty in
giving effect to the devise. -The language of the learned surrogate, BRAD-

HIBNER.
FORD, in 3 Sur. Rep. 148 et seq., is very
pertinent to the present case, and entirely decisive in favor of the devisees.
See also I Redfield on Wills 580, et
seq. and cases cited, where, we trust, it
sufficiently appears, that the former
decisions are all opposed to the one now
before us.
In the principal case, there could be
no question of the admission of oral
evidence to show the state and extent
of the testator's property, in order to
place the court in the same position the
testator was at the time he made the will.
No reasonable man could question this
upon the decided cases. This being done,
it appears the testator had no such land
as that described, in the particular sections named. This rendered it clear,
absolutely certain, we may say, that the
sections named were erroneous and
could have no possible operation, and
must be rejected. The devise then was
the same as if the sections had not been
named at all, or had been named, leaving the numbers blank. We are then
compelled to fall back upon the remaining portion of the description, "eighty
acres of land in range ten, in township
thirty-five," and "forty acres of land
in range ten, in township thirty-five ;"
and, upon inquiry, we find precisely
such pieces of land 'in range ten, in
township thirty-five," belonging to the
testator. This renders the devise as certain as it is possible to make it. The description would not have been one whit
more clear or certain, if the true sections
had been stated ; nor is it in fact rendered
any more uncertain by the insertion of
sections 31 and 32, instead of 32 and
33. It is entirely certain, from the
language of the will, what the testator
must have intended, in either form. He
could not have intended to devise land
to which he never had any title; he
must have intended to devise land which
did belong to him. He had two just
such pieces of land as he names, and
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every way described as these are, with
the single exception of this one false
particular. It is the very case to which
the maxim, false, 4-c., applies, and to
which alone it can apply. The cases
are almost innumerable where similar
errors have occurred ; and we cannot
find a single case where any such devision as that of the principal case has
been made. There are any number of
cases where similar and far more doubtful
devises have been upheld. We should
scarcely feel justified in setting forth
any considerable number of them, but
some few may serve to show how other
courts have viewed similar cases, and
although it may not enable the court to
do justice in this case, it will, we trust,
persuade this court and all others not
to follow the case as an authority.
In Allen v. Lyons, 2 Wash. C. C.
Rep. 475, the devise was of a house
and lot in Fourth street, Philadelphia.
But it appeared on oral proof, admitted
by the court, that the testator had no
such property in Fourth street, but did
own a house and lot in Third street,
and it was held to pass under the devise;
a case so precisely in point that no one
can argue against its application and
control of this case.
In Winkley v. Kaime, 32 N. H. 268,
the devise was of "thirty-six acres,
more or less, of lot 37, in the second
division of Barnstead ;" and it appearing that there was no such lot in that
division, but that the testator owned
land in lot 97, in that division, it
was held to pass under the will. This
case, too, is precisely in point, since
there being no such number, and the
testator not having any land in it, is
the same. And the case of Myers v.
Riggs, 20 Mo. 239, which the court
seem to regard as different from the
principal case, in its principle, seems
to us essentially the same. The fact
that the actual location of the land
devised is sufficiently identified by refer-

ence to natural objects upon it is not
different in principle from its identification bX the remaining portion of the description. All that is required in any
such case is that enough of the description shall be correct, to enable the court
to see clearly what was intended. And in
regard to that there can be no question
in the principal case. It would not be
rendered any more certain by reference
to any number of natural objects on the
land. So that, in fact, the last case
cited is precisely in point, and of controlling authority in the principal case.
There are a great number of cases in
the books where the name of the devisee, whether a natural person or a
corporation, is defectively described,
that involve the same principle as the
principal case. In The Domestic and
Foreign Missionary Society's Appeal, 30
Penna. St. 425, the devise was to the
"missions and schools of the Episcopal
Church about to be established at or
near Point Cresson," and it appeared
the mission was maintained by the
"Domestic and Foreign Missionary
Society of the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the United States ;" and this
society was held entitled to receive the
bequest. And in Button v. The American Tract Society, 23 Vt. 333, a similar
departure from the exact description
was held not fatal to the devise. In
these and many similar cases the description found in the will has to be
rejected, almost every word of it, and
the bequests are given to corporations
almost wholly dissimilar in name,
upon the ground that there being but
one claimant, and that one sufficiently
identified by the erroneous description,
it is proper he should take rather than
the bequest be held wholly void.
In an earlier period of the history
of this rule of evidence, excluding oral
proof in regard to the import and construction of written instruments, there
may be found an occasional case where
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bequests have been held void upon some
such grounds as those relied upon in the
principal case. But in modern times
no such results are allowed except'from
the most inevitable necessity. And it
seems almost incomprehensible how
any such misapprehension of the established rules of evidence and construction
could have occurred in the present case.
But unless we have spent our life, and
studied the books, to small purpose,
there is surely some fatal miscarriage
in this case. The recent decision In re
Gregory, II Jur. N. S. 634, is a very
marked one, going much further than is
required to sustain the devise in the principal case; and we might continue to
cite cases without end fully sustaining
our views ; but we have said enough
if to the purpose, and, if not, the less
said the better. We have not alluded
to the slight variation in the descriptions between "south" and Csoutheast," because it is not relied upon in
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the decision, and is of no possible importance in any view, since the preciae
import of the points of compass, when
used in a general way, and not upon
actual survey, is never rigidly applied
in construction, but regarded only as
an approximation.
We trust we have not failed to express our views in regard to the forego[ng case with all that moderation and
respect which is due to the decision of
so learned and able a court, and which
we most sincerely feel. But that the
decision is fatally and flagrantly erroneous there can be no more question or
doubt than of the axioms of geometry
or the propositions in the most exact
sciences. There is no proposition in
the law of evidence more unquestionable than that the evidence offered was
admissible in aid of the construction,
and that with that aid the devise should
have been upheld.
L F. R.

Western District of Pennsylvania.

ALEX. NIMICK ET AL. v. MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.
A provision in a policy of life insurance that it shall be void if the assured
"shall die by his own hand," includes all kinds of voluntary self-destruction. If
the assured commit suicide, comprehending the physical nature and consequences
of his act and intending to destroy his life, the policy is void, though he may not
have been able to comprehend the moral nature of the act.
In an action on such a policy, the burden is first on the insurer to show that the
insured died by his own hand; and this being done, it then rests upon the plaintiff to prove that the insured was of such insane mind that he did not commit the
act with the knowledge and intent that it should result in death.

Tnis was an action upon a policy of life insurance.
sufficiently appear in the charge of the court.

The facts

John Barton and J. H. Bailey, for plaintiff, cited Breasted v.
Farmers' L. and T. Co., 4 Hill 73; s. c.4 Selden 299; .Estabrook v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224 ; St. Louis Mflut. L.
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-Ins.Co. v. Graves, Ct. of Appeals of Ky. (not yet reported); and
1 Phillips on Ins., &c. §§ 896 and 1162.
Geo. Shiras, Jr., and J. H. Stoner, for defendants, cited Borradai7e v. Hunter, 5 M. & G. 639; Clift v. Schuabe, 3 C. B.
437; Dean v. Am. L. Ins. Co., 4 Allen 96.
MCKENNAN, Circuit J., charged the jury as follows :-This suit
is brought by the assignees of H. C. Benham to recover from the
Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company the sum of $5000, which
it agreed to pay at the death of Benham, upon certain conditions,
set forth in the policy of insurance on which the suit is founded.
The defendants, by their plea, admit all the essential facts
alleged in the declaration, and they are, therefore to be assumed
as fully proved, and the plaintiff's right primarily to recover
as established. But this admission is covered with an averment
that the assured "died by his own hand." Upon this ground the
plaintiff's recovery is resisted.
This allegation is denied by the plaintiffs, and they further reply
that Benham, at the time of his death, was of unsound mind.
Evidence has been produced on both sides touching the manner
of Benham's death, and his mental condition at the time. Of the
sufficiency of this you are to judge, under the instructions presently
to be given.
Upon the party who affirms an essential fact devolves the burden of proving it. It is incumbent on the defendants, then, to
convince you that the assured was the wilful destroyer of his own
life. On the proof of this the defence must stand or fall.
So, if this fact is satisfactorily shown, it is the duty of plaintiffs to make out the allegation that the assured was insane. Insanity is an exceptional condition of the mind, and the legal
presumption, therefore, is that every one is of sound xiind until
the contrary is proved by sufficient affirmative evidence.
You will then inquire, in the first place, as to the manner in
which the assured came to his death. Did he take his own life,
or was it taken by others? Was his death voluntary or accidental? If you find that it resulted from his own act you will
then consider the state of his mind, as it affected the exercise of
his will, and a comprehension of the physical consequences of the
act, aside from its moral character.
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I do not deem it at all pertinent to the practical solution of the
question to invite a discriminating scrutiny of the opinions of the
excellent professional gentlemen who have differed so widely in
judgment upon the same statement of facts as to the sanity of
the assured. It would furnish you no assistance in reaching a
conclusion within the range which the law prescribes as the limit
of your inquiry. How far it is necessary or proper for you to go
in this direction, I proceed to state more fully, in answer to the
points submitted by the counsel on both sides.
The provision in the policy is in these words: "Or in case he
shall die by his own hand * * * this policy shall be void, null,
and of no effect." Literally interpreted, these words import death
under all circumstances caused by the act of the assured, whether
intentional or accidental. Some relaxation of their strict sense,
however, is required by the nature of the contract, to effectuate
the intention and object of the parties, but no qualification of
them, not necessary to this end, is warrantable. They are intended to protect the insurer against the consequence of the
physical act of the assured. They refer distinctly to the physical
agency by which death may be caused; only by implication, quite
speculatiVe, to the moral sensibility of the agent. Their sense,
then, is entirely satisfied by expounding them as describing an
act of the assured resulting in his deth, s pn intended consequence of it, irrpce.ive of his understanding of its moral nature.
Adopting the language of ERSKINE, J., in Borradailev. Hunter,
5 M. & G. 639, "It seems to me that the only qualification that
a liberal interpretation of the words, with referenop to the nature
of the contract, requires, is that the act of self-destruction should
be the wilful act of a man having, at the time, sufficient po)ers
of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of such act, and having, at the time, a purpose and
intention to cause his own death by that act; and that the question whether, at the time, he was capable of understanding and
appreciating the moral nature and quality of his purpose is not
relevant to the inquiry further than as it might illustrate the
extent of his capacity to understand the physical character of the
act itself;" and also the words of BIGELOW, C. J., delivering the
unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
Dean v. Am. Mlfut. Life Ins. Co., 4 Allen 98: " Applying, then,
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the first and leading rule by which the construction of a contract
is regulated and governed, we are to inquire what is a reasonable
interpretation of this clause, according to the interest of the parties. It certainly is very difficult to maintain the proposition
that, where parties reduce their contract to writing, and put their
stipulations into clear and unambiguous language, they intended
to agree to anything different from that which is plainly expressed
by the terms used. It is, however, to be assumed that every part
of a contract is to be construed with reference to the subjectmatter to which it relates, and with such limitations and qualifications of general words and phrases as properly arise and grow
out of the nature of the agreement in which they are found.
Giving full force and effect to this rule of interpretation, We are
unable to see that there is anything unreasonable or inconsistent
with the general purpose which the parties had in view in making
and accepting the policy, in a clause which excepts from the risks
assumed thereby, the death of the assured by his own hand, irrespective of the condition of his mind as affecting his moral and
legal responsibility at the time the act of self-destruction was consummated. Every insurer, in assuming a risk, imposes certain
restrictions and conditions upon his liability. Nothing is more
common than the insertion in policies of insurance of exceptions
by which certain kinds or classes of hazards are taken out of the
general risk which the insurer is willing to incur. Especially is
this true in regard to losses which may arise or grow out of an
act of the party insured. Such exceptions are founded on the
reasonable assumption that the hazard is increased when the insurance extends to the consequences which may flow from the
acts of the person who is to receive a benefit to himself or confer one on others by the happening of a loss within the terms
of the policy. Where a party secures a policy on his life, payable to his wife or children, he contemplates that, in the event of
his death, the sum insured will inure directly to their benefit.
"So far as a desire to provide, in that contingency, for the welfare and comfort of those dependent upon him can operate on his
mind, he is open to the temptation of a motive to accelerate a
claim for a loss under the policy by an act of self-destruction.
Against the increase of the risk arising from such a cause, it is
one of the objects of the proviso in question to protect the in-
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surers. Although the assured can derive no pecuniary advantage
to himself by hastening his own death, he may have a motive to
take his own life, and thus to create a claim under the policy in
order to confer a benefit on those who, in the event of his death,
will be entitled to receive the sum insured on his life. Unless,
then, we can say that such a motive cannot act on a mind dis.eased, we cannot restrict the words of proviso so as to except
from the risk covered by the policy only the case of criminal suicide, where the assured was in a condition to be held legally and
morally responsible for its acts. It certainly would be contrary
to experience to affirm that an insane person cannot be influenced
and governed in his actions by the ordinary motives which operate on the hman mind. Doubtless there may be cases of delirium
or raving madness where the body acts only from frenzy or blind
impulse, as there are cases of idiocy or the decay of mental power,
in which it acts only from the promptings of the lowest animal
instincts. -But in the great majority of cases where reason has
lost its legitimate control, and the power of exerQising a sound
and healthy volition is lost, the mind still retains sufficient power
to supply motives and exert a direct and essential control over
their actions. In such cases the effect of the disease often is to
give undue prominence to surrounding circumstances and events,
and, by exaggerating their immediate effects or future consequences, to furnish incitement to acts of violence and folly. A
person may be insane, entirely incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong, and without any just sense of moral responsibility, and yet retain sufficient powers of mind and reason to act
with premeditation, to understand and contemplate the nature
and consequence of his own conduct, and to intend the results
which his acts are calculated to produce. Insanity does not
necessarily operate to deprive its subjects of their hopes and
fears, or the otlhe mental emotions which agitate and influence
the minds of persons in the full possession of their faculties. On
the contrary, its effect often is to stimulate certain powers to
extraordinary and unhealthy action, and thus to overwhelm and
destroy the due influence and control of the reason and judgment.
Take an illustration: A man may labor under the insane delusion
that he is coming to want, and that those who look to him for
support will be subjected to the ills of extreme poverty. The
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natural effect of this species of insanity is to create great mental
depression, under the influence of which the sufferer, with a view
to avoid the evils and distress which he imagines to be impending
over himself and those dependent upon him for support, is impelled to destroy his own life. In such a case suicide is the wilful
and voluntary act of a person who understands its nature, and
intends by it to accomplish the result of self-destruction. He
may have acted from an insane impulse which prevented him from
appreciating the moral consequences of suicide; but nevertheless
may have fully comprehended the physical effect of the means
which he used to take his own life, and the consequences which
might ensue to others from the suicidal act.
"It is against risks of this nature-the destruction of life by
the voluntary and intentional act of the party assured-that the
exception in the proviso is intended to protect the insurers. The
moral responsibility for the act does not affect the nature of the
hazard. The object is to guard against loss arising from a particular mode of death. The causa causans, the motive or influence
which guided or controlled the will of the party in committing the
act, are immaterial as affecting the risk which the insurers intended
to except from the policy. This view is entirely consistent with
the nature of the contract. It is the ordinary case of an exception of a risk which would otherwise fall within the general terms
of the policy. These comprehended death by disease, either of
the body or brain, from whatever cause arising. The proviso
exempts the insurers from liability when life is destroyed by the
act of the party insured, although it may be distinctly traced as
the result of a diseased mind. It may well be that insurers would
be willing to assume the risk of the results flowing from all diseases
of the body, producing death by the operation of physical causes,
and yet deem it expedient to avoid the hazards of mental disorder,
in its effects upon the will of the assured, whether it originated
in bodily disease or arose from external circumstances, or was
produced by a want of moral and religious principle.'
I have appropriated so much of these opinions because they
could not be abridged without impairing the completeness of the
argument presented by them with so much force and clearness.
They declare what is now, upon the fullest discussion and consideration, and after repeated decisions, the settled law of Eng-
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land, and of one of the most respectable judicial tribunals in the
United States. I am not unmindful that there is some diversity
of adjudication in reference to this question; but, in my judgment,
the weight of authority, as well as of reason and argument, is
decidedly in favor of the construction adopted.
We must not forget that we are dealing with a contract, reduced
to writing, and founded upon the assent of both parties to it. It
is our imperative duty, then, to expound and enforce it as the
parties themselves have made and declared it to be, not as we
might think it ought to have been made.
If you are not satisfied, by the evidence, that Horace C. Benham came to his death by his own hand, you will find for the
plaintiffs the amount claimed by them in this suit.
If, however, you believe from the evidence that he committed
self-destruction, that he intended to destroy his life, and comprehended the physical nature and consequences of his act, the
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, and your verdict should be
for the defendant.
The jury found a verdict for plaintiffs for $5440.

Supreme Court of Missouri,
JOHN A. HAMPTON ET UX. v. BENJAMIN STEVENS.
Taking an acknowledgment of a deed is a quasijuicial act, and cannot be performed by a party interested.
A trustee in a mortgage or deed of trust to hold in pledge, with power of sale,
&c., is so far a party in interest that he is not competent to take the acknowledgment of the deed.
The want of proper acknowledgment does not affect the validity of the deed,
but prevents it from being legally recorded.
If a deed shows upon its face that it was not legally acknowledged (as where
the acknowledgment was taken by a party), it is not entitled to be recorded, and
though it is in fact entered on the records, it is not constructive notice to subsequent purchasers; but if the acknowledgment is regular on its face, then it is
properly recorded, and its record operates as notice, notwithstanding there may
be some hidden defect.
But even with a patent defect in the acknowledgment, and therefore without
legal record, a subsequent purchaser with notice in fact will take subject to the
deed.
If the purchaser at a sale under a deed of trust pays his money and takes a
deed before he has notice, either in fact or constructively by legal record, of a

HAMPTON v. STEVENS.
prior deed, his title is protected, even though his vendors, the trustee and boneficiary had notice in fact of the prior deed.
A deed of trust recited that it was made to secure a promissory note due the
beneficiary, whereas in fact it was made to indemnify him as surety on a note to
a third person. Held, that the amount of the debt being correctly described, and
the transaction being without fraud, there was no such misdescription as should
affect the validity of the deed.

Tuis was an action of ejectment for certain lands near the city
of Hannibal, and both parties claimed under one Carmi Hobson,
and were purchasers at sales under different deeds of trusts executed by him. The one under which Stevens, the plaintiff, claimed,
was given in June 1859 to Edward A. Lockwood, as trustee, to
secure the plaintiff in certain notes for the purchase-money, and
some months after was acknowledged before the said trustee. It
was not, however, filed for record until March 1861, and in the
mean time, to wit, on the 28th of July 1860, said Hobson
executed another deed of trust to John E. Lockwood, trustee,
purporting to secure a note given to one Hoffner for $1050, but
in fact given to secure said Hoffner as surety upon such note to a
third person, which last deed was immediately recorded. In
August 1861, which was after the first deed was recorded, the
defendant, Mrs. Hampton, purchased at a trustee's sale under
the deed last executed but first recorded, and the purchase-money
was applied to extinguish the note for which the beneficiary
Hobson had become liable; and in 1864 the plaintiff purchased
under a sale made by his trustee. The other facts sufficiently
appear in the opinion of the court.
James Carr, for plaintiff in error.-I. Hoffner was surety for
the grantor in the-second deed of trust. He is a creditor within
the purview of the law, although he had not paid the debt secured
when the sale took place under the deed to secure him: -DuvallvRaisin, 7 Mo. 449; Scott v. Bailey, 23 Id. 150; Eastman v.
Foster, 8 Met. 19; Hubbard v. Savage, 8 Conn. 214; Mix v.
Coules, 20 Id. 420.
2. He is a bond fide purchaser for a valuable consideration
without notice, and as such he is entitled to be protected: Story's
Eq. §§ 165, 981, 409, 410; lFrisby v. Thayer, 25 Wend. 398;
James v. Johnson, 6 Johns. Ch. 407.
3. The deed of trust executed by Hobson to John E. Lock-

HAMPTON v. STEVENS.

wood to Susan Hoffner having been recorded first, secured the
first lien on the property in controversy: Sec. 40, 41, and 42
Revised Statutes, 1855, ch. 32, p. 364; Walden v. Bussell, 5
Mo. 387; Bellas v. McCarty, 10 Watts 13; Vaughn v. Tracy,
22 Mo. 415; Beattie v. Butler, 21 Id. 322; Williamson v. Brown,
15 N. Y. 354.
4. The plaintiff in error, Susan Hampton, is protected as a'
purchaser under Hoffner, although she may have purchased with
actual notice of the first deed: Fort v. Burch, 5 Denio 187.
5. The true amount of the incumbrance is recited in the deed
of trust under which the plaintiff in error claims title. No person
was or could be misled as to the extent of it. The misrecital of
the note then will not vitiate said deed of trust: Scott v. Brierly,
23 Mo. 150; Shirras et al. v. Craiget al., 7 Cranch 34; Jackson v. Bowen, 7 Cow. 13; 4 Id. 406; 3 Id. 530; 8 Johns. 455.
6. The recording of the first deed of trust after the second, but
before the sale under the second, is no notice actual or constructive to the cestui que trust in the second deed of trust:
Styvesant v. Hall,2 Barb. Ch. 158; Trescott v. King, 6 Barb.
346; Bushel v. Bushel, 1 Scho. & Lef. 99; Liebey v. Wolf, 10
Ohio 80; Halstead v. Bank of .Ky., 4 J. J. Marshal 558; Wiseman v. Westland, 1 Young & Jervis 117; Bedford v. Backhouse,
W. Kelynge 5.
7. The acknowledgment of the grantor to the first deed of trust
was taken by Edward A. Lockwood, the trustee, to himself. It
was not proved by any subscribing witness. The recording of it
was not in pursuance of any law. Hence it did not impart notice
to any person.
John T. Bedd, for defendant in error.-I. The elder trust
deed having been given bond fide to secure a valid subsisting
debt for the purchase-money due plaintiff, he is entitled to precedence over a creditor whose debt is secured by a junior trust
deed, in accordance with the maxim, Qui prior est tempore potior
estjure, and he can only be postponed to a bond fide purchaser
for valixe without notice. If the subsequent trust deed was taken,
the trustee and creditor having actual notice of the prior deed,
the claimants under the junior deed are not bond fide purchasers,
but are, as to the prior trust creditor, purchasers mala fide. A
purchaser with notice of a prior deed takes subject to that deed.
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Under the evidence in the cause the court erred in refusing to
submit the question of actual notice to the jury.
2. If Hobson, in point of fact, was not indebted to Hoffner,
and if in point of fact no such note as that described in the trust
deed, as executed by Hobson and payable to Hoffner, had an
existence, the making of the trust deed by Hobson, and its acceptance by Hoffner to secure such false and fictitious debt, was
fraudulent as to the creditors of Hobson, and consequently void,
and the title could not be set up by John E. Lockwood, the
trustee, and Hoffner the pretended creditor, as against the prior
unrecorded deed. This state of facts made the purchase on'their
part maid fide, and without any valuable consideration, there
being no consideration but the pretended debt, evidenced by the
note recited; and the defendant's purchase under this voluntary
and mald fide deed, having been made five months after the prior
deed had been recorded, she was affected with notice.
3. The court told the jury that if the junior deed was recorded
before Hoffner (the pretended creditor) had notice of the prior
deed, they ought to find for defendant. This instruction took
from the jury all question as to the bona fides of the deed or its
consideration.
4. The court told the jury that the fact that the defendant
paid her purchase-money and received her deed before she had
actual notice of the prior trust deed, entitled her to a verdict.
Under this instruction, the jury, finding the facts embraced in it
were proved, so found for defendant, although they were satisfied,
from the evidence, that the deed of trust under which defendant
claims was fraudulent, and that the prior deed was on record five
months before she purchased. The defendant, to entitle her to
protection against plaintiff's elder title, must show either, 1st.
That she is a bond fide purchaser for a valuable consideration
without notice of plaintiff's elder title; or, 2d. That her grantor
is a purchaser bond fide for a valuable consideration without
notice. She has failed to show either.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BLISS, J.-We must treat the deed to Edward A. Lockwood,
trustee, and acknowledged before him, as though never acknowledged, unless we assume that a party to a deed may take its
acknowledgment, which will not be seriously claimed. There are
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several cases where an acknowledgment was attacked upon the
ground of interest in the party taking it, and in every case the
incompetency of a grantee is assumed: G-roesbeek v. Seely, 13 Mich.
829. The court says, "We should have no hesitation in holding
that a person could not take the acknowledgment of a deed made
to himself. Such a point is too plain for doubt." .Dussaume v.
Burnett, 5 Iowa 103, seems to recognise the doctrine that the
party to the instrument cannot take its acknowledgment. And
in Wilaon v. Hare &. Co., 20 Id. 231, an acknowledgment before
one of the grantees is expressly held to be void. The court, in
Beaman v. Whitneq, 20 Maine 413, speaks of an acknowledgment before a grantor "as at most a void acknowledgment leaving the deed operative between the parties," &c. Withers v. Baird,
7 Watts 227, was an action of covenant to receive the price of
a tract of land, and the defence was that no sufficient deed had
been tendered. It appeared that the plaintiff, who had agreed
to make the deed, obtained one from one Baxter and wife, who
held the title, which was made directly to the defendant and
acknowledged before the'plaintiff. The court (GIBsoN, J.) held
the acknowledgment to be insufficient to bar the dower of Baxter's wife, as the duties of a magistrate in regard to her separate
examination are judicial, and cannot be performed by a party
interested. On the other hand, Lyneh v. Livingdton, 6 N. Y.
422, and Kimball v. Joohn8on, 14 Wis. 674, seem to recognise a
contrary doctrine, although I think there is no real conflict. In
the former case, an ordinary acknowledgment was held to be a
ministerial act, and hence did come under the prohibition against
the action of judges or jurors who were relatives of the parties.
In the latter case, a mortgage was given to a married woman to
secure her for money loaned which belonged to her separate
estate and was acknowledged before her husband. In regard to
this action, the court simply says, "We do not think on that
account he was disqualified from taking it." In this case, the
husband was not a party to the instrument, and could have no
interest in the separate estate of the wife, and the court doubtless treated his action as ministerial, and not affected by his
relationship to the grantee.
In the cases referred to where the acknowledgment was held
invalid, the party taking it was or was supposed to be a party in
interest, I have found no case where it was taken by a trustee;
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and perhaps there might be ground for holding that where the
grantor was a mere naked trustee, the title by the Statute of
Uses vesting at once in the beneficiary, the acknowledgment
should be held to be valid. But trustees to hold in pledge with
power of sale stand in a very different relation. The objection
to the party in interest is analogous to the one forbidding a judge
to pass upon his own case. Though the act may not be strictly
judicial, it is of a judicial nature, and requires disinterested
fidelity. We know that in practice this kind of trustee is always
solicited by the beneficiary; he is controlled by the beneficiary
in fixing the time of sale, and its proceeds come into his hands.
There is such an interest that as to the requisites of the deed
itself he should be placed upon a level with the other parties, and
be incapacitated from holding any official relation to its execution.
The want of a proper acknowledgment does not, however, invalidate the deed, but only goes to the effect of the record. If
not acknowledged or proved, its record is not provided for by law,
and the fact that it may be copied upon the book of records will
not operate as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers: Dussaume v. Burnett, supra; Schultz v. Moore, 1 McLean 520; Barney v. Sutton, 2 Watts 31; Hastingsv. faugkhn, 5 Cal. 315; Price
v. McDonald, 2 Md. 403; Johns v. Scott, 5 Id. 81. The deed,
however, is good as between the parties, and should prevail against
subsequent deeds to those who had actual notice of its existence:
Dussaume v. Burnett, supra; Caldwell v. Head, 17 Mo. 561;
Corby v. .Ranlin, 11 Id. 647.
In view, then, of the acknowledgment as affecting the right
of record and the question of constructive notice, the following
would seem to be a reasonable rule: That where the recorded
instrument shows upon its face that the acknowledgment was
taken by a party or parties in interest, it is improperly recorded,
and is no constructive notice; but where it is fair upon its face,
it is the duty of the register to receive and record it, and its record
operates as notice, notwithstanding there may be some hidden
defect.
In the case at bar the second trust deed, that is, the one under
which defendant purchased, is the only one entitled to record, and
the question of priority, so far as it depends upon constructive
notice, need not be considered; still, if the beneficiary in that
deed was actually advised in regard to the former before he
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assumed the obligation upon the strength of the security, his lien,
so far as he is concerned, must be subject to that created by such
former deed, though otherwise as to an innocent purchaser from
him.
Upon the subject of notice, the plaintiff asked for instructions
to the jury, which the court refused to give, embracing the following points :1st. That if Hoffner, the beneficiary in the second deed of
trust, had notice, at the time of its execution and delivery, of the
former. deed, the plaintiff should recover, notwithstanding such
former deed was not filed for record until after the record of the
second deed, provided the former deed was recorded before the
sale to defendant.
2d. That if John E. Loociwood, the trustee in the second deed
of trust, had notice, at the time of its execution and delivery, of
the former deed, the plaintiff should recover, notwithstanding, &e.
But the court, at defendant's instance, gave the following:1st. "If the deed of trust to secure Hoffner was recorded
before he had notice of the deed in favor of Stevens, the jury
will find for the defendant.
2d. "If the deed to Mrs. Hampton was made and the money
paid before she had notice of a prior deed other than by the
records, they will find for defendant, even though Hoffner had
notice."
By comparing the instructions refused with the second one
given, it will be seen that the court held Mrs. Hampton, the
defendant, who bid in, and claims title to the property, to be
protected by her ignorance of the former deed, notwithstanding
Hoffner the beneficiary and his trustee may have been advised of
such deed. It seems to have been for this supposed error that
the District Court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court,
though it appears also to have treated the record of the first deed,
with its defective acknowledgment before the sale under the second
deed, as constructive notice. In this the Circuit Court committed
no error; and the law upon the subject cannot be better stated
than in the language of Judge STORY: 1IIf a person who has
notice sells to another who has no notice, and is a bond fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, the latter may protect his
title, although it was affected with the equity arising from notice
in the hands of the person from whom he claimed it, for otherwise
VOL. XIX.-8
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no man would be safe in any purchase, but would be liable to have
his own title defeated by secret equities of which he could have
no possible means of making a discovery." And, after quoting
an old English authority, he further says: "This doctrine has
ever since been adhered to as an indispensable muniment of title.
And it is wholly immaterial of what nature the equity is; whether
it is a lien or encumbrance, or a tract, or any other claim; for a
bond fide purchaser of an estate for A valuable consideration,
purges away the equity from the estate in the hands of all persons who may derive title under it, with the exception of the
original party whose conscience stands bound by the violation of
his trust, and meditated fraud :" Story's Eq. 88, 409, 410; see
also Foot v. Buch, 5 Denio 187.
Another question is raised by thb record. The second trust
deed, being the one under which Mrs. Hampton purchased, purports to be given to secure a promissory note due the beneficiary,
when the evidence shows that it was given to indemnify him as
surety upon a note to a third person, and that the proceeds of the
sale were applied in payment of such note. It does not appear
that the purchaser knew of this misdescription of the debt. But,
whether she knew it or not, there is no such variance as should
affect the validity of the second deed. The legal title was in the
trustee, the amount of the debt was correctly described, the default was made, and the proceeds of the sale were applied to
extinguish the contingent liability to the beneficiary, as well as
the actlial liability to the payee of the note. No fraud is pretended, and there was no such misdescription as could injure any
one. The courts have uniformly sustained bond fide mortgages,
notwithstanding the debt may have been incorrectly set out in
the condition, and parol evidence is admissible to explain the consideration: Scott v. Baily, 23 Mo. 140 ; Skiras v. Craig, 7
Cranch 36.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and that of the
Circuit Court affirmed.

ROBERTS v. NELSON.

United States Circuit Court, Southern District of New York.
WILLIAM H. ROBERTS v. RENSSELAER R. NELSON.
Where the record of a suit at the time it- is removed from a state to a Federal
court under the Act of 1789, shows the matter in dispute to exceed $500, a subsequent reduction of the demand by the plaintiff in his pleadings will not entitle
him to have the case remanded.
Nor will the fact that the suit as developed by the pleadings subsequent to the
removal, includes a claim not cognisable in a Federal court, entitle it to be
remanded. The jurisdiction of the Federal court having once attached, no subsequent event can divest it.
In August 1870 an action was commenced in the Supreme Court of New York
by summons, commanding defendant to appear or have judgment entered against
him for $330, with interest from July 1st 1858. Before any other steps were
taken the defendant appeared and filed a petition to have the case removed to the
United States Circuit Court on the ground that he was a citizen of Minnesota.
The state court granted the petition and the cause was removed. Plaintiff then
filed his declaration in the Circuit Court showing a claim for $187.25, with
interest from January 1st 1859, and also another claim for $43.25, as assignee
of one Pierce, a citizen of New Jersey, and thereupon moved to remand the case
to the New York court. Held, that the cause could not be remanded.

THIS was a motion on the part of the plaintiff for an order
remanding the suit to the Supreme Court of the state of New

York.
B. S. Guernsey, for plaintiff.
Bdward H. Hfawke, for defendant.
BLATOHFORD,

J.-This suit was commenced in the Supreme

Court of New York by the service on the defendant of a summons

dated August 1st 1870, unaccompanied by the service or filing
of a complaint. The summons is called on its face a "summons
for a money demand on contract."

It notifies the defendant that

the complaint will be filed- without specifying when, and requires
him to answer it within twenty days after the service of the

summons, and notifies him that if he shall fail to do so, the plaintiff will take judgment against him for the sum of $330.25, with
interest from July 1st 1858, besides the costs of the action. The
time for the defendant to appear or answer was extended by
consent until October 15th 1870. The defendant entered his

appearance in the state court in the suit on the 14th of October,
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and at the same time filed therein a petition praying for the
removal of the suit into this court, and offered proper surety
therefor. On the 17th of October the state court, on such petition, entry of appearance, and offer of surety, made an order
stating that it was made to appear to the satisfaction of that court
that this suit was commenced in that court by a citizen of the
state of New York against a citizen of the state of Minnesota,
and that the matter in dispute exceeded the sum of $500, exclusive of costs, and ordering that such surety be accepted, and that
the suit be removed for trial into this court. The proceedings for
removal were instituted under the provisions of the 12th section
of the Act of September 24th 1789: 1 U. S. Stat. at Large 79.
The petition presented to the state court by the defendant stated
that the matter in dispute in the suit, and for which the suit was
brought, exceeded the sum of $500, exclusive of costs, and a
copy of the summons was annexed to the petition. No proceeding other than the service of the summons took place in the state
court prior to the filing by the defendant of the papers for
removal. Copies of the process and the other papers in the suit
were entered in this court, and subsequently the plaintiff filed a
declaration in this court, in the suit in assumpsit, in which he
counts on an indebtedness due to him by the defendant July 1st
1858, amounting to $287.25, less a payment thereon of $100
April 16th 1858, and also on an indebtedness due to one Pierce
by the defendant April 10th 1858, for merchandise then sold by
Pierce to the defendant, amounting to $43.25, and an assignment
of such claim by Pierce to the plaintiff in 1867. The declaration
claims to recover $230.50, and interest thereon from July 1st
1858, and avers that the plaintiff brought this suit in the Supreme
Court of the state of New York by summons, and that an order
was made in that court, on the motion of the defendant, transferring the action to this court. The declaration also states that
the suit is brought by the plaintiff in his own behalf, and also in
behalf of his assignor, Pierce, "a citizen of the state of New
Jersey since the year 1860." After filing this declaration the
plaintiff now makes the motion to remand, on an affidavit alleging
that the declaration is for $187.25, and interest thereon from
January 1st 1859, and for the Pierce claim, assigned to the
plaintiff, and interest thereon from July 1st 1858, and that Pierce
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is not now, and has not been since the year 1860, a citizen of the
state of New York, but a citizen of the state of New Jersey.
One ground arghed in support of the motion is, that the amount
claimed in the summons was only $330.25, and interest from July
1st 1858; that this amount could hot be said to be over $500;
that it might or might not have brought the recovery to over
$500 ; and that 'the rate of interest might have been, by agreement, such as to have made the recovery less than over $500.
The petition in the state court avers positively that the matter in
dispute in the suit, and for which the suit is brought, exceeds the
sum of $500, exclusive of costs. This makes a case directly
within the 12th section of the Act of 1789. The right of removal depends upon the facts as they exist when the suit is commenced. The language of the section is that if "a suit be
commenced," &c., "and the matter in dispute exceeds," &c.
The plaintiff does not now assert that the matter in dispute when
the suit was commenced, as shown by the summons, did not
exceed $500, exclusive of costs, or that the sum of $330.25, with
interest from July 1st 1858 to August 1st 1870, did not amount
to $500. On the record in the state court it must be held that
the matter in dispute exceeded, when the suit was commenced,
the sum of $500, exclusive of costs. The jurisdiction of this
court having once attached, no subsequent event could divest it:
Clarke v. Hathewson, 12 Pet. 164. 'Therefore, the reduction
of the amount of the claim by the declaration filed in this court
cannot affect the question.
The second ground in favor of the motion to remand is, that
this court is forbidden to take cognisance of the suit. The 11th
section of the said Act of 1789 provides that this court shall not
have cognisance of any suit to recover the contents of any chose
in action in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been
prosecuted therein to recover the said contents, if no assignment
had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange. It
is claimed that the debt of $43.25 is a chose in action; that a
suit for it could not have been prosecuted in this court by the
assignor, Pierce, a citizen of New Jersey, against the defendant,
a citizen of Minnesota; that this court has no cognisance of this
suit so far as the debt for the $43.25 is concerned; and that
therefore this court has no cognisance of any part of the suit.
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Admitting that this court has no cognisance of the suit, so far as
concerns the right to recover the amount due on the claim
assigned by Pierce to the plaintiff, it by no means follows that it
has no right to proceed in the suit in respect to the other claim.
I think it has. The asserting by the plaintiff, in his declaration,
of a right to recover the $43.25 in this court in the suit, when he
has no such right, cannot be allowed to give him the right, on his
own motion, to send the entire case back to the state court, and
deprive the defendant of a right to a trial in this court in respect
to the other claim set up in the declaration. Nor is it a ground
for granting the motion to remand the entire suit that if the claim
for the $43.25 be stricken out, the other claim will, with interest,
not amount to over $500, exclusive of costs. The jurisdiction of
this court over the case having been complete when it was
removed, cannot be ousted by the action of the plaintiff in inserting such a claim in the declaration as the claim for the $43.25.
Nor is the insertion of such claim a ground for remanding so
much of the case as concerns such claim. If this court cannot
give judgment for the plaintiff for such claim, he can sue to
recover its amount in some proper court. If he does not desire
to proceed in this court in respect of the other claim, he can
discontinue the entire suit. But, on the record, the defendant
has a right now to retain the case in this court, and the motion to
remand must be denied.

Supreme Court of New Brunswick.
BURKE v. NILES.
A lot of land was described in a grant as "1beginning at a stake standing on
the bank or edge of Round Lake, thence," &c. (describing three lines of the lot),
"to a stake standing on the westerly bank or edge of the said lake, and thence following the several courses of the said bank or edge to the place of beginning."
Held, 1st. That the title under the grant extended to the margin of the lake, and
was not limited by a stake standing on the bank. 2d. That the grantee was entitled to land formed in front of the lots by the gradual receding of the waters of

the lake.
Under a grant of a "lake," reserving to the grantor all mines and minerals,
the soil of the lake passes.

TRESPASS for breaking and entering the plaintiff's close and
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carrying away grass, with a count for assault and battery. The
defendant pleaded not guilty, with a plea of justification of the
assault in defence of his property.
It appeared at the trial that the plaintiff was the owner of lot
No. 2, in a grant from the Crown to Joseph Burke and others,
dated 28th April 1828, in which the land was described as follows: "Beginning at a stake standing on the bank or edge of
Round Lake (so called), the said stake being distant 53 chains
from a marked spruce tree standing on the rear or south-easterly
line of the grant to John Downing and associates; thence north
15 degrees west, &c. (stating several courses); thence south 75
degrees east, 110 chains to a stake standing on the westerly bank
or edge of the said lake, and thence following the several courses
of the said bank or edge in a northerly direction to the place of
beginning; and also particularly described and marked out on
the plan of survey hereunto annexed." Round Lake was about
half a mile wide, and navigable for boats.
The defendant claimed under a grant from the Crown, dated
10th March 1851, in the following words: "All that certain lake
in the parish of Botsford, distinguished as Round Lake, containing 245 acres; together with all profits, hereditaments, &c,,
thereunto belonging or appertaining, except and reserving nevertheless to us, our heirs and successors, all coals, and also all gold
and silver, and other mines and minerals."
After the defendant obtained the grant, he commenced to
drain the lake, and reduced the depth of the waters about five
feet, at the rate of about a foot a year, according to his evidence.
The grass, for the taking of which the action was brought, had
been cut by the plaintiff on the shore of the lake between the top
of the bank where the high land commenced, and the water; and
the assault was committed by the defendant in driving the plaintiff off this piece of land where the grass was cut. The defendant
contended that the plaintiff's grant was bounded by the top of
the bank; also that the land where the grass was cut had been
part of the bed of the lake which he had gained by drainage, and
c6nsequently that it belonged to him by his grant. The judge
directed the jury that the plaintiff's grant was not limited to the
top of the bank, but extended to the water of the lake, and that
if the water receded gradually and imperceptibly, the land so left
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dry would belong to the plaintiff; though it would be otherwise
if the reliction was visible and sudden, caused by the defendant's
drainage; and he left it to them to find whether the place6 where
the grass was cut had been dry land when the defendant's grant
issued, or whether it had become so since by his drainage-directing them in the former case to find a verdict for the plaintiff for
taking the grass. The jury being unable to agree on the question
submitted to them, the judge then directed them to find for the
plaintiff for the trespass, having doubts whether the defendant's
grant gave him any interest in the soil of the lake. He also
directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the count for the assault
which was not justified, whether the locus in quo belonged to the
defendant or not. The jury found a verdict accordingly; and a
rule nisi for a new trial having been granted on the ground of
misdirection,
J. J. Fraser showed cause.-He contended, 1st. That the
plaintiff's grant extended to the centre of the lake, or, at all
events, that as he and the parties under whom he claimed had
used the land between the top of the bank and the edge of the
water for twenty years, it could not be taken from him by a
subsequent grantee of the Crown without an inquest of office.
2d. That the plaintiff was entitled to the accretion formed by the
receding of the lake-the same rule applied as in case of a river.
3d. That the defendant's grant gave him no interest in the land;
that the grant of a river eo nomine did not convey the soil, but
only a right to use the water: Co. Lit. 4 b; 14 Vin. Abr. 92;
Bac. Abr. Grant (J)3;.Woolrych on Waters 151; Angell on
Watercourses, §§ 5, 41, 42, 52, 54; 2 Wash. on Real Prop. 524,
632.
A. L. Palmer, contrd, contended, 1st. That the plaintiff's land
did not extend beyond the bank of the lake; 2d. if it did, the
accretion was not gradual and imperceptible, and consequently
that the locus in quo did not belong to the plaintiff; 3d. that
the grant to the defendant conveyed the soil. A grant of stagnum
conveyed both the water and the soil: Cruise's Dig. Deed, ch.
21, § 49; 4 Bac. Abr. 85; Angell on Watercourses, §§ 44, 56,
57, 157, 158. The exception of the "mines and minerals"
showed that it was the intention of the Crown to grant the soil.
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RITCHIE, C. J., deliyered the judgment of the court (after
stating the grants under which the parties claimed).-The principal questions arising in this case are, 1st. Whether the plaintiff's
grant extends to the margin of the lake, or was limited to the
stake described as standing on the bank ? 2d. Whether the plaintiff, as the riparian proprietor, was entitled to any accretion from
the lake in front of his own land? and 3d. Whether the grant to
the defendant conveyed the soil of the lake or merely the water ?
In Angell on Watercourses, § 26, it is said: "If a boundary
is described as running to a monument standing on the bank, and
from thence running 'by the river,' or ' along the river,' it does not
restrict the grant to the bank of the stream; for the monument
in such case is only referred to as giving the direction of the line
to the river, and not as restricting the boundary on the river."
And in Robinson v. White, 42 Me. 218, it is said that although
the monuments are described as standing on the margin or bank
of the stream, the grant carries the title of the grantee to the
centre of the river, unless its terms clearly denote an intention to
stop at the margin. The same principle is applicable here as to
highways. Thus it has been held, that where a piece of land
adjoining a highway, is conveyed by general words, the presumption
of iaw is, that the soil of the highway, uspte ad medium filum,
passes by the conveyance, even though there is a plan annexed
which would appear to exclude it: Berridge v. Ward, 10 C.
Bench, N. S. 400; Lord v. Commissioners of Sydney, 12 Moore
P. C. 497. See also Beg. v. The Board of Works, 8trand, 4 B.
& S. 526. We think the intention of the Crown was, that the
lake should be one of the boundaries of the plaintiff's grant, and
that the words "bank or edge" were intended to express the
same thing, and that they mean the margin of the lake-thus
extending the grant down to the water's edge, and not leaving a
strip of ungranted land or beach between the margin of the lake
and the top of the bank where the highland commenced. The
words "1edge" and "margin" are synonymous terms, and therefore we think the words of the grant cannot be satisfied unless it
is extended to the margin of the lake.
This involves another question-whether the plaintiff s grant
is limited to the margin of the lake as itexisted at the date of
the grant, or whether it will also include any land formed in

